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DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY IN A HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE CONTEXT:  
DOLS AND THE WAYS FORWARD 
 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) were introduced in England and Wales in 
2007 and came into force in 2009 as a response to the European Court of Human 
Rights decision in the case of HL v UK.1 The Court held that the lack of legal 
safeguards for incapacitated adults deprived of their liberty in hospitals and care 
homes, the so-called ‘Bournewood gap’, was a breach of Article 5 (Right to liberty and 
security) of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
Recent developments have reinforced the importance of discussions about the future 
of DoLS. First, the House of Lords Select Committee post-legislative scrutiny of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 concluded in 2014 that DoLS, due to their excessive 
complexity and lack of clarity, are not ‘fit for purpose’ and called for them to be 
replaced. Second, the Supreme Court decision in Cheshire West and Cheshire 
Council v P2clarified that an incapacitated person, whose care arrangements are the 
state’s responsibility, is to be considered objectively deprived of her liberty if she is 
subject to continuous supervision and control and is not free to leave. This is the case 
irrespective of the person’s compliance or lack of objection and of the relative normality 
of the placement or the reason for it. This decision has had a major impact on social 
and health care bodies, who have been overwhelmed by the consequent increase in 
the number of applications.3 Baroness Hale, who wrote the leading opinion in Cheshire 
West, recognized the need for a system that expands the protection to placements 
outside hospitals and care homes, but that does not need to be as elaborate as DoLS.4 
Considering the findings of the House of Lords Select Committee and the Supreme 
Court decision in Cheshire West, the Law Commission is currently working on 
proposals to replace DoLS with a system that would suit health and social care 
providers and users better. 
 
In the context of a general acceptance that legal reforms are necessary, this issue of 
the IJMHCL brings together research articles and contributions based on relevant 
experience in legal practice and policy-making to discuss deprivation of liberty in 
health and social care settings. This issue draws on the ‘Rethinking Deprivation of 
Liberty in a Health and Social Care Context’ conference held in London on 30 
September, 2015. This conference, convened by the Department of Law at Queen 
Mary University of London with the support of the Wellcome Trust5, assembled experts 
from different jurisdictions to consider alternatives to DoLS. It was convened – in part 
– to inform the Law Commission’s deliberations as to the replacement for DoLS, a 
project which remains underway as at the date of publication.6 
 
                                                          
1 HL v UK (2004) 40 EHRR 761. 
2 Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] UKSC 19. 
3 Health and Social Care Information Centre (2015). Mental Capacity Act (2005) Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguards (England): Annual Report, 2014-2015.  
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6 See Law Commission (2015) Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty: A Consultation Paper, 
Consultation Paper 222, and Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty: Interim Statement (May 2016), 
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One of the overarching conclusions that can be drawn from the conference and this 
IJMHCL issue is that the debate about DoLS – and indeed any regime for the 
authorising of deprivation of liberty – should be part of a broader conversation about 
how to reconcile health and social care users’ need for care and support with their 
right to liberty and autonomy. Meeting needs and protecting rights rarely have to be 
competing objectives. 
 
This edition starts with Eilionóir Flynn’s ‘Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards and 
International Human Rights Law: Reconciling European and International 
Approaches’. The author engages with the question of whether disability-specific 
forms of deprivation of liberty are in themselves compatible with both the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). This article analyses the difficulties for 
domestic legislation of reconciling Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR, which authorizes 
restrictions to liberty based on a mental disability, and Article 14 of the CRPD, which 
can be interpreted as ruling out any disability-specific form of deprivation of liberty. 
This sets the scene for Eilionóir Flynn’s analysis of the current law in England and 
Wales and the Law Commission’s proposals to replace DoLS. 
 
Gordon R. Ashton offers a critical analysis of DoLS from his personal perspective as 
a judge of the Court of Protection and as the parent of a social care service user.  
‘DoLS or quality care’, discusses the relation between legal safeguards and the quality 
of the patients’ care. Gordon R. Ashton argues that the former does not guarantee the 
latter and may even be detrimental to it depending on how they are perceived or 
applied. A whistle blowing procedure is proposed as an alternative to DoLS. 
 
‘Deprivation of Liberty: the position in Scotland’, by Laura J. Dunlop Q.C., discusses 
the response to the ‘Bournewood gap’ and to Cheshire West proposed by the Scottish 
Law Commission. A decision not to adopt DoLS in Scotland was made in light of the 
difficulties with its operation in England and Wales. The author, who served on the 
Scottish Law Commission, discusses the challenges of developing a scheme that is 
easy to operate, sensitive to different individual circumstances, protective of the liberty 
of adults with incapacity, and compatible with the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights. 
 
A case-study on the application of the current legal framework for protecting the right 
to liberty of psychiatric patients is offered by Benjamin Perry, Swaran Singh and David 
White in ‘Capacity Assessment and Information Provision for Voluntary Psychiatric 
Patients: A Service Evaluation in a UK NHS Trust’. Based on data collected from one 
mental health trust they suggest that more needs to be done to ensure vulnerable 
individuals are not being coerced to consent to treatment or are accepted as informal 
patients without a proper assessment of their mental capacity to consent.  
 
Widening the perspective further, Bo Chen discusses the protection of the rights of 
persons with mental disabilities in China in ‘Xu vs. the Hospital and his Guardian – 
Involuntary Inpatient Treatment’. Mental health legislation was introduced in China in 
2013 to elevate the threshold for involuntary inpatient treatment there but, as shown 
in this case note, the application of the law raises questions about the compliance of 
the Chinese legislation with the CRPD. This case note also highlights the challenges 
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of implementing legislation that is protective of the right to liberty of people with mental 
disabilities in a context where social care in the community is insufficient.   
 
We would like to acknowledge the editorial support provided by Emma Vogelmann, 
the peer reviewers for their careful revision of the articles, and the overall guidance 
provided by Kris Gledhill as the IJMHCL Editor-in-Chief. 
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